A case may be transferred under § 1404(a) only to a district where the plaintiff could have originally filed it, not to a district that becomes proper only because the defendant consents.

Facts:

Blaski and others filed patent infringement actions in the Northern District of Illinois against the defendants, who resided in Texas and had no business contacts or operations in Illinois. The defendants moved to transfer the cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the Northern District of Texas, arguing that Texas was more convenient and appropriate for trial. The plaintiffs objected, arguing that the Texas court lacked personal jurisdiction and venue over the original claim at the time of filing, and therefore, transfer under § 1404(a) was improper. Despite the objections, the district court granted the transfer. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and the case went to the Supreme Court to resolve the issue.

Issue:

Can a federal district court transfer a case under § 1404(a) to a district where the action could not have originally been brought, but where the defendant consents to jurisdiction and venue?

Holding:

No. A case may only be transferred under § 1404(a) to a district where the action might have been brought originally, meaning the transferee court must have had both proper personal jurisdiction and venue at the time the case was filed, independent of defendant consent. Allowing transfer based on post-filing consent by the defendant would undermine the statute’s purpose and open the door to circumvention of venue protections, particularly for plaintiffs. It would also allow defendants to pick and choose venues after litigation starts, which Congress did not intend. The Court refused to expand § 1404(a) beyond its literal and historical limits.

The Meaning of “Might Have Been Brought” Is Strict

👉 The case stands for a textual, narrow interpretation of § 1404(a).
You can only transfer to a district where the plaintiff could have filed the case originally, based on venue statutes and personal jurisdiction — not just anywhere the defendant agrees to go later.

⚠️ Consent ≠ Cure under § 1404(a).

📝 Amended Statutory Language (Post-Hoffman):

Congress amended § 1404(a) to now read:

“...a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”

📌 New phrase added: “...or to any district... to which all parties have consented.”

• Under the amended statute, transfer is now permitted to a district that was not proper at the time of filing — so long as all parties consent.
• This overrules Hoffman on its core holding that consent alone is not enough for § 1404(a) transfer.

🧠 Hypo 1:

Plaintiff, based in Florida, files a tort action in the Eastern District of Texas against a Delaware-incorporated defendant with its principal place of business in New Jersey. The events giving rise to the claim occurred in Oregon. Texas has no connection to the case, and neither party resides or does business there. After filing, both parties agree to transfer the case to the District of Oregon, where the events occurred, but where the defendant would not have been subject to personal jurisdiction at the time of filing.

❓ Can the case be transferred to Oregon under § 1404(a)?

✅ Answer:

Yes. Under the amended language of § 1404(a), a case may be transferred to any district to which all parties have consented, even if that district would not have satisfied venue or jurisdiction requirements at the time of filing. Here, both parties agree to transfer the case to Oregon, making it a valid consent-based transfer under the modern version of the statute.

🎯 Key Principle: The amended § 1404(a) expressly allows transfer by consent, overriding the Hoffman limitation when all parties agree.

🔹 Hypo 2: No Consent + No Jurisdiction = No Transfer (Hoffman Controls)

Plaintiff, a citizen of Illinois, files a copyright infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida against Defendant, a corporation incorporated and headquartered in Alaska, with no offices, customers, or contacts in Florida. The alleged infringement occurred in Alaska and Washington state.

Defendant moves under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer the case to the District of Wyoming, arguing that Wyoming would be more convenient for its legal team, and it has recently opened a small satellite office there. Plaintiff objects to the transfer and does not consent. At the time of filing, the defendant had no business operations, employees, or property in Wyoming.

❓ Can the case be transferred to Wyoming under § 1404(a)?

✅ Answer: No.

Under Hoffman v. Blaski, a case can only be transferred under § 1404(a) to a district where the case could have been brought at the time it was filed, based on venue and personal jurisdiction. In this hypo:

• Venue in Wyoming was not proper at the time of filing.
• Personal jurisdiction was also lacking in Wyoming at that time.
• There is no party consent to override those defects under the amended statute.

Defendant’s convenience or later developments (like opening an office) do not retroactively cure the original jurisdictional and venue defects.